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HOUSE-SENATE BUDGET CONFERENCES

Institutional and Strategic Advantages

Southern Methodist University

In 1975, the power of the purse was set within a new congressional budget process. Taxing and spending decisions that previously had been handled in a piecemeal and uncoordinated fashion became subject to comprehensive congressional budget resolutions that set fiscal policy and spending priorities. This represented an important change in executive-legislative relations. It also created, however, another arena for House-Senate conflicts over control of the purse. This article examines the conflicts that subsequently have emerged and how they have been resolved by House-Senate conference committees. It suggests that institutional theories about the House and Senate do not satisfactorily explain budget conference outcomes. Strategic advantages associated with preconference positions must be taken into account, as well.

American Politics Research, Vol. 11, No. 1, 71-90 (1983)
DOI: 10.1177/004478083011001004


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