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Structural Reforms and Licensing Board Performance

University of Southern California

Michael B. Nichol

University of Southern California

In an effort to redress the perceived imbalance between practitioner and consumer interests on occupational licensing boards, two structural reforms have been widely implemented: the addition of public members to the boards, and the consolidation of the licensing function into a single administrative entity within each state. The extent to which these reforms have improved the consumer oriented performance of licensing boards is evaluated, using the rate of disciplinary actions as the performance measure. Estimation of a multivariate model using physician and nursing board data reveals evidence in support of the effectiveness of public board members, but not administrative centralization, as a consumer reform. Increased proportions of public members are associated with more serious disciplinary actions. Administrative centralization is associated with fewer disciplinary actions.

American Politics Research, Vol. 18, No. 3, 376-400 (1990)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X9001800306


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