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Partisan Transformation of the Federal Judiciary, 1869-1992

Auburn University

Gerard S. Gryski

Auburn University

Deborah J. Barrow

Auburn University

Time series analytic models are developed to evaluate institutional and political factors affecting the president's ability to appoint same-party members to the federal courts over the period 1869-1992. Controlling for party of the president, the authors examine the percentage of partisan appointments to and voluntary departures from these courts. The authors find that although the outcomes of presidential elections lead to sweeping changes in the partisan composition of the bench, the judiciary itself plays a large role in abetting same-party appointments through politically timed departures. Government control (unified versus divided) also enters the equation, as does the unique politics of filling positions created by omnibus judgeship legislation. The study underscores the importance of interinstitutional relationships to analyses of change in the partisan composition of the judiciary.

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