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American Politics Research
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Investing in the Future

Economic Political Action Committee Contributions to Open-Seat House Candidates

Ronald Keith Gaddie

Tulane University

The preponderance of literature on political action committees (PACs) focuses on the incumbent-oriented contribution strategies of PACs. Contributions to open-seat candidates remain unexplored. This study examines contributions by four major economic PAC cohorts to open-seat House campaigns from 1982 to 1988. Political action committees pursued precise contribution strategies when giving to open-seat candidates and responded to a variety of candidate attributes and national electoral influences. Corporate and trade PACs displayed evolving, bipartisan strategies, whereas labor PACs exclusively supported Democrats. These results suggest that interest groups pursue sophisticated contribution strategies in open-seat elections that resemble the influence and access strategies pursued when giving to incumbents. Interest group-legislator relationships exist before new members assume office, and these preexisting relationships merit consideration in efforts at congressional electoral reform. In particular, the claim that term limit reforms will break interest group linkages to Congress may be unfounded and merits further exploration.

American Politics Research, Vol. 23, No. 3, 339-354 (1995)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X9502300305
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