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The President, Congress, and Appropriations, 1951-1985

University of Houston

In this article, the author develops a model of appropriations behavior that treats appropriations decision making as a two-stage process. At the heart of the model is the conjecture that the historical cooperation between the president and Congress in appropriations conceals strategic congressional behavior that has linked regular and supplemental appropriations. The model implies certain patterns of presidential and congressional behavior in regular appropriations, supplemental appropriations, and impoundments, which are examined using data covering the fiscal years 1951-1985. The results of the analysis not only strongly support the conjecture but shed light on the implications of divided government as well as recent developments in congressional budgetary behavior.

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