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American Politics Research
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Revisiting the Relationship Between Secret Ballots and Turnout

A New Test of Two Legal-institutional Theories

JAC C. HECKELMAN

Wake Forest University

Two theories within the legal-institutional framework concerning the Australian ballot system's effect on voter turnout are analyzed. The vote market hypothesis assumes secret ballots were designed to end the buying and selling of votes. The secrecy the new ballot provided discouraged candidates from buying votes they could no longer verify, disproportionately affecting poor voters who would respond to this loss of payments by voluntarily abstaining. Alternatively, the theory of strategic disfranchisement predicts Blacks and illiterates were specifically targeted for disfranchisement. The new ballots were expected to be more difficult for these voters to use and they would then be effectively prevented from participating in the active electorate. Although turnout decreases under either theory, the normative implications are very different. Controlling for race and illiteracy, regression analysis suggests poor voters were less likely to vote a secret ballot. A similar effect is not found for Black and illiterate voters when controlling for income. The evidence is thus more consistent with the vote market hypothesis than with a pure disfranchisement effect.

American Politics Research, Vol. 28, No. 2, 194-215 (2000)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X00028002003
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