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Presidential Influence and Minority Party Liaison on Veto Overrides

New Evidence from the Ford Presidency

University of Florida

Prior studies of executive-legislative relations have not adequately examined presidential influence on veto overrides. This research posits that presidential liaison with party leaders in Congress can play a crucial role in forging sustaining coalitions and is an element of presidential skill that has been overlooked. The study examines Gerald Ford’s relations with the 94th Congress and focuses on legislators’ decisions to change positions to sustain the president’s vetoes between the passage of the original legislation and veto override attempts. Archival data are integrated into a multinomial logistic regression analysis of vote-switching by Republican legislators to test the impact of leadership contact on voting decisions. The results emphasize the importance of partisan linkages between the White House and the minority party leadership organization on Capitol Hill as part of Ford’s bicameral strategy to halt veto overrides.

American Politics Research, Vol. 30, No. 1, 34-65 (2002)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X02030001002


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