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Modeling Legislator Decision Making

A Historical Perspective

University of Rochester

Mitchell S. Sanders

University of Notre Dame

Although scholars have put enormous effort into developing models of legislative choice behavior, they may not have sufficiently considered the underlying choice process and its relationship to the institutional environment. Our analysis does so by jointly integrating more realistic models of legislator decision making with a historical perspective on institutional evolution. We apply a unified model, incorporating participation and vote choice in a theoretically and econometrically sensible manner, to roll call voting and participation choices in the 73rd (1933-1934), 89th (1965-1966), and 104th (1995-1996) United States Congresses. We consider whether the same factors affect behavior over time, whether abstention choices affect outcomes, and whether integrating voting and participation is advantageous. Our models fit the data well and reveal significant, intuitive, differences in decision making over time that are related to Congress’s development and that are relevant for policy. Realistic models and an appreciation for institutional evolution are related and important for considering legislative choice behavior.

American Politics Research, Vol. 30, No. 3, 235-264 (2002)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X02030003002


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