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American Politics Research
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Don’t Bite The Pac That Feeds You

Business Pac Punishment Over the China Vote

David J. Jackson

Bowling Green State University

Steven T. Engel

Georgia Southern University

Previous research has found evidence that in high-profile cases, political action committees (PACs) sometimes punish members of Congress for voting in opposition to the PACs’ interests. This finding contradicts the conventional understanding of campaign contributions as an inducement or reward for voting record or access to a member of Congress. To understand better the dimensions of the punishment strategy, we test whether corporate PACs engage in punishment by examining the pattern of contributions of finance and insurance PACs in the wake of the House vote on granting permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) with China in May 2000. Using ordinary least squares regression models, we find support for a punishment strategy of finance and insurance PACs as a result of a no vote on PNTR. The magnitude of the punishment is highest for those members of the House who have the strongest relationship with the PAC.

Key Words: political action committees • campaign financing • labor politics • PAC punishment • trade politics

American Politics Research, Vol. 31, No. 2, 138-154 (2003)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X02250289
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