Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here to sign up for SAGE Journal Email Alerts today!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
American Politics Research
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Biglaiser, G.
Right arrow Articles by Peake, J. S.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Back on Track

Support for Presidential Trade Authority in the House of Representatives

Glen Biglaiser

David J. Jackson

Jeffrey S. Peake

Bowling Green State University

Challenging conventional wisdom, which suggests that constituency interests and membership ideology guide legislative voting on trade, we argue that the relative importance of these factors fluctuates depending on party control of the presidency. Such is the casewith the House of Representatives opposing fast-track trade negotiating authority in 1997 and 1998 and then supporting trade-promotion authority in 2001. The shifting political context represented by the change in partisan control of the presidency changed the salience of ideology and constituency factors among House Republicans, leading to major trade policy changes. Using logit analysis for position taking in the House on fast track, we explore the relative effects of a variety of cross pressures on trade policy preferences across time.

Key Words: fast track • trade-promotion authority • presidential-congressional relations • trade

American Politics Research, Vol. 32, No. 6, 679-697 (2004)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X03262391
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 American Politics ResearchHome page
B. Rottinghaus and E. Lim
Proclaiming Trade Policy: "Delegated Unilateral Powers" and the Limits on Presidential Unilateral Enactment of Trade Policy
American Politics Research, November 1, 2009; 37(6): 1003 - 1023.
[Abstract] [PDF]