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American Politics Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, 336-357 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X06296571

Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency Rules

Amy McKay

University of Iowa, Iowa City

Susan Webb Yackee

University of Southern California, Los Angeles

In the lobbying literature, the effects of competition—two or more interests lobbying on opposing sides of a policy debate—have not been assessed with regard to government agency policymaking. Consequently, neither the amount nor the effect of competitive lobbying is well understood. Using nearly 1,700 comments on 40 federal agency rules, we evaluate two questions: Do government agencies respond to lobbying by changing agency policies? and Does lobbying on one side of a policy issue beget lobbying on the opposing side? We demonstrate that agencies change the content of final rules in favor of the side that dominates the submission of comments. Thus, it seems the "squeaky wheel gets the grease" during rulemaking. We find no evidence, however, of counteractive lobbying during agency rulemaking. Our results suggest that interest groups may further their policy goals by observing more closely the actions of opposing groups during agency policymaking.

Key Words: interest groups • organized interests • competitive lobbying • bureaucracy • agency rulemaking


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