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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X06296571 Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency RulesUniversity of Iowa, Iowa City
University of Southern California, Los Angeles In the lobbying literature, the effects of competitiontwo or more interests lobbying on opposing sides of a policy debatehave not been assessed with regard to government agency policymaking. Consequently, neither the amount nor the effect of competitive lobbying is well understood. Using nearly 1,700 comments on 40 federal agency rules, we evaluate two questions: Do government agencies respond to lobbying by changing agency policies? and Does lobbying on one side of a policy issue beget lobbying on the opposing side? We demonstrate that agencies change the content of final rules in favor of the side that dominates the submission of comments. Thus, it seems the "squeaky wheel gets the grease" during rulemaking. We find no evidence, however, of counteractive lobbying during agency rulemaking. Our results suggest that interest groups may further their policy goals by observing more closely the actions of opposing groups during agency policymaking.
Key Words: interest groups organized interests competitive lobbying bureaucracy agency rulemaking
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