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Strategic Selection of Legal Instruments on the U.S. Supreme Court

Texas A&M University-Commerce

I examine and empirically test a central assumption of strategic models of Supreme Court behavior. Specifically, I consider whether the Court selects legal instruments used in the majority opinions of federal statutory cases to reduce the likelihood that Congress will overturn that opinion, in particular whether the Court invokes constitutional interpretation over statutory interpretation to avoid congressional "overrides" in cases involving federal statutes. Using decisions from the 1953 to 2000 Court terms, I find evidence that when the Court anticipates that Congress may overturn its opinion, the Court is more likely to employ constitutional interpretation in its opinion. These findings confirm that opportunities for the Court to behave strategically are not limited to voting behavior but instead extend to other areas such as choice of legal instruments.

Key Words: U.S. Supreme Court • legal rules • strategic instrument theory • constitutional interpretation • statutory interpretation • judicial behavior • judicial policy preferences

American Politics Research, Vol. 35, No. 5, 621-642 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X07299701


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