| Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools. |
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X07301654 © 2007 SAGE Publications Bureaucratic Capacity and Bureaucratic DiscretionDoes Congress Tie Policy Authority to Performance?Kent State University
Kent State University This article assesses whether the managerial capacity of agencies influences the volume of policy authority that lawmakers delegate. Examining a sample of agencies whose managerial capacities were assessed along the same criteria, and allowing for the comparison of performance across agencies, we observe that poorly performing agencies are more likely to lose policy authority. Our findings suggest that lawmakers promote effective policymaking by giving agencies the incentive to perform well and that models of discretion that do not account for performance underestimate the effect of another factor—policy conflict between the legislative and executive branches—on how much discretion agencies receive.
Key Words: bureaucracy Congress public policy bureaucratic discretion agency capacity delegation policy authority
|