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Strategic Lobbying

Demonstrating How Legislative Context Affects Interest Groups' Lobbying Tactics

University of Pittsburgh

Do interest groups strategically select lobbying tactics in response to the legislative context of policies they wish to influence? As rational actors, interest groups should be keen to spend their resources wisely by responding strategically to legislative contexts. This research suggests a theoretical and empirical framework and attempts to explain variations in interest group behavior at the policy level. The empirical design associates direct and indirect interest group lobbying activities with specific policies and tests the hypothesis that interest groups use legislative context as a part of their decision calculus when considering how to lobby Congress. I find that measures of legislative context are important components of models of direct and indirect lobbying.

Key Words: interest groups • legislative process • U.S. Congress • lobbying • legislative context

American Politics Research, Vol. 35, No. 6, 826-845 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X07300681


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