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Testing Murphy's Strategic Model

Assigning the Majority Opinion to the Marginal Justice in the Conference Coalition on the U.S. Supreme Court

University of North Carolina at Charlotte

Saul Brenner

University of North Carolina at Charlotte

Murphy contended that an astute chief justice could assign the majority opinion to the "most moderate member" of the conference coalition, hoping that such an assignment "might prevent defection or even gain adherents." We discovered that Murphy's model was partially supported with data from the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts. When the conference coalition was larger than minimum winning (mw), assignment of the majority opinion to the marginal justice in the conference coalition was more likely to result in an opinion joined by the other justices in the conference coalition, making it an effective defensive strategy. It may not, however, be a very effective offensive strategy.

Key Words: Supreme Court • marginal justice • coalition formation • judicial decision making • judicial politics

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