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Ambition and Party Loyalty in the U.S. Senate

University of Minnesota, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, streul{at}unc.edu

This article examines the role progressive ambition plays in the U.S. Senate. I analyze the effect ambition has on party loyalty in the upper chamber. The theoretical argument is that senators with ambition for higher office are more loyal to the party than their colleagues who never make a bid for higher office because of their need to appeal to the party base to secure the party's nomination. I posit the following hypothesis to test this theory: A senator who seeks higher office will be more likely to vote with the party on party votes than those senators who never run for the presidency. My findings indicate that ambitious senators are more loyal to the party than their colleagues who never make a bid for higher office. That is, senators who run for higher office recognize the importance of the party when it comes to successfully navigating the primary season.

Key Words: political ambition • progressive ambition • party loyalty • U.S. Senate • legislative behavior

This version was published on May 1, 2009

American Politics Research, Vol. 37, No. 3, 449-464 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X08322260


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