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Assessing Presidential Power

Signing Statements and Veto Threats as Coordinated Strategies

Miami University, Oxford, Ohio

Bryan W. Marshall

Miami University, Oxford, Ohio

Presidents have a wide array of strategies to influence legislation. One area that has seen less emphasis in the literature is the executive's unilateral ability to issue signing statements and their role in shaping policy. We develop a spatial model illustrating how the president's bargaining power with Congress can be expanded when the veto threat is coordinated with signing statements. The analysis suggests that signing statements, although underappreciated, may potentially be a valuable presidential tool in the veto bargaining process. The analysis also shows that veto threats are a key factor explaining the president's use of the constitutional signing statement. We infer that veto threats and signing statements are linked together as part of a larger coordinated strategy to exert presidential power in the legislative realm.

Key Words: presidency • presidential power • signing statements • presidential vetoes • veto bargaining • unilateral action

This version was published on May 1, 2009

American Politics Research, Vol. 37, No. 3, 508-533 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X08324426


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