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Counteractive Lobbying in the U.S. Supreme Court

University of North Texas, Denton

Paul M. Collins, jr

University of North Texas, Denton, pmcollins{at}unt.edu

Theories of counteractive lobbying assert that interest groups lobby for the purpose of neutralizing the advocacy efforts of their opponents. We examine the applicability of counteractive lobbying to explain interest group amicus curiae participation in the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on the merits. Testing the counteractive lobbying hypotheses from 1953 to 2001, we provide strong support for the contention that interest groups engage in counteractive lobbying in the nation's highest court. Our findings indicate that, like the elected branches of government, the Supreme Court is properly viewed as a battleground for public policy in which organized interests clash in their attempts to etch their policy preferences into law.

Key Words: counteractive lobbying • interest groups • amicus curiae • U.S. Supreme Court

American Politics Research, Vol. 37, No. 4, 670-699 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X08328674


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