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American Politics Research
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Are Mapmakers Able to Target and Protect Congressional Incumbents?

The Institutional Dynamics of Electoral Competition

Chad Murphy

University of California, Riverside

Antoine Yoshinaka

University of California, Riverside, antoine{at}ucr.edu

Can those in charge of redistricting foster electoral competitiveness by targeting some congressional incumbents while protecting others from potent competition? We provide an answer by presenting the dynamic redistricting thesis, which holds that the type of redistricting plan and the time passed since its enactment affect the emergence of high-quality congressional candidates. We demonstrate that the effect of redistricting on competition depends on whether incumbents belong to the party that controlled the redistricting process. We show that partisan plans have predictable systematic effects, with incumbents in the minority more likely to face strong opponents. Moreover, the effect of redistricting on competition is highest at the beginning of the 10-year redistricting cycle and diminishes in a nonlinear fashion over the course of the cycle. The implications of our theory and findings for democracy are apparent: Institutions are an important determinant of the variation of electoral competition across time and space.

Key Words: congressional elections • electoral competition • incumbency • apportionment • gerrymandering • redistricting • representation • dynamic redistricting thesis

This version was published on November 1, 2009

American Politics Research, Vol. 37, No. 6, 955-982 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X08326385
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