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The Advantage of Incumbency in House Elections

Florida State University

This article offers another perspective on the electoral advantage of incumbents in House elections. The explanation (or theory) builds on the contributions of Richard Fenno, Morris Fiorina, David Mayhew, and Anthony Downs. The basic premise is that the electoral advantage enjoyed by House incumbents is a function of their ability to focus constituent attention on aspects of their job performance, or characteristics related to job performance, that produce favorable impressions of their overall performance. Incumbents are able to focus constituent attention, because they exercise a great deal of control over the dissemination of information about themselves. Since congressional elections are low information contests, the voting decision is reduced to a vote for, or against, change. Voters are likely to vote against change-electoral support for incumbents—because the information they receive about (and from) the incumbent convinces them that their congressman is doing a good job in looking after the interests of the district; they also fear that the challenger might do a worse, rather than a better, job than the incumbent in looking after the district.

American Politics Research, Vol. 8, No. 4, 449-464 (1980)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X8000800404


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