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American Politics Research, Vol. 34, No. 6,
705-731 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X06289159
Preferences, Parties, and Legislative Productivity
Fang-Yi Chiou
Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
Lawrence S. Rothenberg
University of Rochester, New York
Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) utilized models of legislative productivity, synthesizing parties and preferences by deriving and measuring different equilibrium gridlock intervals, finding that such models outperformed alternatives depending on preferences alone. However, their temporal scope is limited to post-World War II. Generalizing theoretical models—notably recognizing the 1917 enactment of Rule 22 creating the Senate filibuster rule—and expanding historical scope empirically will produce results, inspiring greater confidence and better ability to distinguish whether partisan features matter. Hence, the authors generalize and test models using data extending to the late 19th century. Results indicate that a model combining preferences with party unity better explains outcomes than does a preference-based model, a model where parties control the agenda but cannot discipline members, or a model where the president rules his legislative party. In addition, findings are consistent with the inference that Rule 22 did not change the filibuster rule guiding the Senate substantially.
Key Words: legislative majorities • U.S. Congress • filibusters • legislative gridlock • political party unity
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