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American Politics Research, Vol. 30, No. 6, 608-629 (2002)
DOI: 10.1177/153267302237230
© 2002 SAGE Publications

Enforcement and Oversight: Using Congressional Oversight to Shape OSHA Bureaucratic Behavior

Barbara Headrick

Moorhead State University

George Serra

Bridgewater State College

Jim Twombly

University of Buffalo

This research is an extension of the body of work seeking to explain variation in levels of OccupationalSafety and Health Administration (OSHA) enforcement as a function of national andlocal variation in the agency's political environment. Although we examine a number of relationships,the new question is whether legislative oversight affects the behavior of OSHA complianceofficers at the district level. OSHA is an interesting test case of the impact of oversight onbureaucratic output because of the way policy is implemented—enforcement takes place in thefield by street-level bureaucrats, far removed from the federal office. Using data gathered at thecongressional district level (1983-1995), results suggest that variation within OSHA's enforcementbehavior is influenced by oversight committee assignment, overall oversight committee'sand appropriations subcommittee's attitudes toward labor, and the district representative's dispositiontoward labor issues. We conclude legislative oversight indeed imposes limitations oncompliance officers' district-level enforcement actions.

Key Words: congressional oversight • OSHA • street-level bureaucrat • bureaucratic responsiveness • House committees


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J. Public Adm. Res. Theory., January 1, 2008; 18(1): 33 - 55.
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