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Congressional Roll Call Voting on China Trade Policy

Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois

This article analyzes roll call voting on China’s most favored nation (MFN) and permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to ascertain interchamber difference and party polarization in China trade policy. In the House, party has the largest impact, with Republicans much more supportive of MFN than Democrats. Ideology has the second largest impact, with conservatives and liberals voting against moderates. In the Senate, party is the sole significant determinant of MFN voting. In House voting on PNTR, ideology has the biggest and party the second biggest impact. The lopsided nature of the Senate PNTR vote indicates that ideology, party, and constituency interests had little or no impact. In both MFN and PNTR voting in the House, constituency economic interests have only marginal effects, and only constituency interests adversely affected by trade with China have significant impact on the PNTR vote. The author concludes by situating the findings in the broad debate about interchamber difference and increasing polarization in Congress.

Key Words: U.S. Congress • roll call voting • China • trade policy • most favored nation status • constituency interest

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