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Strategic Intercameral Behavior and the Sequence of Congressional Lawmaking

North Carolina State University, Raleigh

In the vein of some fledgling theoretical work on Congress, I look for evidence of strategic intercameral behavior in the chamber sequence of the passage of 950 bills from 1955 to 2002. Specifically, I construct and test a semiformal model in which communication is assumed to take place between congressional majority party leaders capable of choreographing bill passage using their agenda control powers. These leaders allow the chamber with the majority whose ideal point is furthest from the president's to pass its version of the bill first. The empirical analysis corroborates the model.

Key Words: Congress • legislation • bill passage • intercameral behavior • legislative sequence • partisan coordination

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