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<title>American Politics Research</title>
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<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/5/639?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Who Whips?: Party Government and the House Extended Whip Networks]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/5/639?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Little recent research on congressional parties has considered the relationship between the vast extended leadership and shifting partisan dynamics. This article draws on conditional party government theory to argue that elected House leaders use the extended whip networks to achieve somewhat different goals under weaker and stronger party government conditions and that these priorities are reflected in the whip systems' membership. Specifically, the whip system reflects caucus diversity under weaker party government but becomes disproportionately stacked with loyalists as party government conditions grow stronger; this shift reflects heightened leadership focus on agenda coordination and signaling under strong parties. The evidence on whip system composition and selection in the Democratic caucus (95th to 106th Congresses) provides very strong support for this argument. An examination of the Republican conference fails to support the main hypothesis but shows that the 1990s growing GOP majority whip network was unrepresentatively dominated by the cohort of junior members.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Meinke, S. R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07313673</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Who Whips?: Party Government and the House Extended Whip Networks]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>668</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>639</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/5/669?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S. District Courts]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/5/669?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Does the hierarchical relationship between the district courts and the courts of appeals influence decision making at the trial level? Do these judges anticipate responses by appellate panels and condition their decisions based on these expectations? Using a sample of district court cases from 1925 to 1996 that were subsequently reviewed by the courts of appeals, and incorporating a strategic choice statistical framework, I discover that the district courts are constrained by the anticipated responses of the appeals courts. However, this conclusion is not apparent if one analyzes the data using traditional maximum likelihood methods. Only when empirical analyses specifically model underlying strategic relationships does one discover this constraint. If the federal trial judges anticipate a negative response on appeal, then they curtail their ideological influences (the magnitude of influence decreases by approximately one-half). This pattern remains consistent when one examines civil liberties and economic cases, but not for criminal cases. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary appears to exert a significant constraint on the district courts.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Randazzo, K. A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08317286</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S. District Courts]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>693</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>669</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/5/694?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Dimensions of Negative Messages]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/5/694?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Candidates and campaign strategists believe that negative campaigning works&mdash;negative messages depress citizen's evaluations of targeted candidates. However, scholars have been unable to validate consistently the claims of practitioners. To better understand how negative campaigning influences the electorate, it is necessary to consider the relevance and civility of negative messages. In particular, do citizens make distinctions concerning the relevance and civility of campaign messages? If so, do citizens' views about the relevance and civility of negative messages influence how they evaluate candidates? We rely on an experimental research design embedded in a public opinion survey to examine people's reactions to negative commercials. Based on a national survey of nearly 700 respondents, we find citizens differentiate between negative advertisements in meaningful and consistent ways. Furthermore, the civility and relevance of the negative commercials significantly influences people's evaluations of the targeted candidates in several ways, including trait, affect, and issue evaluations.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Fridkin, K. L., Kenney, P. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08316448</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Dimensions of Negative Messages]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>723</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>694</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/5/724?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Interparty Differences in Elite Support for Presidential Nomination Candidates]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/5/724?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Studies of the 1970s and 1980s viewed the political party insiders as having little influence on the selection of the presidential nominees. Recent studies, however, find a significant effect for party elite endorsements in presidential nomination campaigns. This study presents a theory of elite influence in the postreform presidential nomination system and analyzes patterns of elite party endorsements to address questions of when and why elites converge on a preferred candidate. Both party- and candidate-centric factors appear to affect elite endorsements of presidential candidates. Elite elected officials are mainly motivated to have a nominee with electoral appeal. Fewer elite Democratic elected officials endorse presidential candidates, they endorse later, and they tend to divide their endorsements among the presidential candidates to a greater degree than do elite Republican elected officials.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Steger, W. P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07311542</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Interparty Differences in Elite Support for Presidential Nomination Candidates]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>749</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>724</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/5/750?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[After the Supreme Word: The Effect of McCreary County v. ACLU (2005) and Van Orden v. Perry (2005) on Support for Public Displays of the Ten Commandments]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/5/750?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In this article, I explore the role that "reception" of Supreme Court cases plays in attitude change. By <I>reception</I>, I mean that individuals must be exposed to and understand Court cases to be influenced by them. I conducted a quasi-experiment during June 2005 to test whether receiving <I>McCreary v. ACLU</I> and <I> Van Orden v. Perry</I> increases the probability of attitude change on public displays of the Ten Commandments. I also examine the relationships among receiving cases, preexisting beliefs, source credibility, and attitude change. I find that receiving <I>McCreary</I> is associated with less support for the unconstitutional Kentucky display. Also, the effect of receiving <I> Van Orden</I> is related to one's preexisting beliefs.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Unger, M. A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08315856</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[After the Supreme Word: The Effect of McCreary County v. ACLU (2005) and Van Orden v. Perry (2005) on Support for Public Displays of the Ten Commandments]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>775</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>750</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/5/776?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Housing Starts and the Political Business Cycle]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/5/776?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The political business cycle (PBC) literature has, generally, been characterized by a relatively narrow set of economic variables and by unidirectional causal analysis. I challenge both of these traditional constructions. First, I expand the search by examining a surprisingly understudied component of the political economy: the housing market. As a vital component of the American macroeconomy, housing is an uncharacteristically powerful tool for politicians and political analyses alike. Second, I use vector autoregression to more accurately model the dynamic and reciprocal nature of the economic and political interrelations found in PBCs. I find significant evidence of PBCs in the U.S. housing market from 1959 to 2005.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ladewig, J. W.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08319228</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Housing Starts and the Political Business Cycle]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>798</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>776</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/4/479?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Voting Technology, Ballot Measures, and Residual Votes]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/4/479?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>An increasing number of public policy issues are decided by ballot measures in the United States. We examine residual votes (the difference between the total ballots cast and the votes cast in a particular contest) on ballot issues and the presidential contest in 34 states that had issues on the ballot in the 2004 election. Residual vote levels for ballot issues are substantially higher and more varied than for the presidential contest. Residual votes in both types of contests are a function of ballot features, voting technology, campaign context, and demographic measures. However, some factors, especially voting machinery, have different effects on residual votes for president than on residual votes for ballot issues. A case study further indicates that full-face electronic voting machines sharply increase the number of residual votes on ballot measures. The results have implications for direct democracy and election reform in the United States.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kimball, D. C., Kropf, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-09</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08320405</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Voting Technology, Ballot Measures, and Residual Votes]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>509</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-07-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>479</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/4/510?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Digital Divide or Just Another Absentee Ballot?: Evaluating Internet Voting in the 2004 Michigan Democratic Primary]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/4/510?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The use of Internet voting in public elections has been challenged based on claims that it is biased against minorities and lower income voters. Although previous research has supported these claims, we find that race and other socioeconomic factors do not affect the choice of Internet voting when it is used as an absentee voting method. Using individual-level vote data from the 2004 Michigan Democratic Primary, we model the two-stage decision-making process that voters face where they must first decide to cast an absentee ballot and then decide what ballot to use (Internet or mail). Our findings show that Internet voting is not more biased than other absentee voting methods, although younger voters are much more likely to choose to vote online.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Prevost, A. K., Schaffner, B. F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-09</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08318586</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Digital Divide or Just Another Absentee Ballot?: Evaluating Internet Voting in the 2004 Michigan Democratic Primary]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>529</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-07-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>510</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/4/530?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Whose Votes Count?: Undervotes, Overvotes, and Ranking in San Francisco's Instant-Runoff Elections]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/4/530?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>We examine the first 3 years of San Francisco's instant-runoff voting (IRV) elections to determine whether some voters adapt more easily than others to the more complex ballot and decision task. We draw on studies of uncounted votes to develop hypotheses about tendencies to undervote, overvote, and rank candidates in IRV elections. Individual ballot records and precinct-level census data are used to estimate the relative influences of demographic and election-specific factors. A natural experiment tests whether or not prior experience with IRV makes a difference. The change to IRV appears to have increased the rate of overvotes and decreased tendencies to undervote. Both behaviors are explained by demographics and aspects of the electoral environment. Meanwhile, tendencies to rank candidates were shaped less by demographics and more by contextual factors and prior exposure to IRV. The findings extend the literature on uncounted votes, inform issues of equality in elections, and provide practical insights on this type of electoral reform.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Neely, F., Cook, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-09</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08318110</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Whose Votes Count?: Undervotes, Overvotes, and Ranking in San Francisco's Instant-Runoff Elections]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>554</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-07-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>530</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/4/555?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Worth a Thousand Words?: An Analysis of Georgia's Voter Identification Statute]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/4/555?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Georgia has joined the states seeking to require the presentation of a picture identification (ID) card, such as a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)&mdash;issued ID, before a person can vote. Opponents charge that this requirement makes it more difficult for minorities, the elderly, the poor, and those living in rural areas to participate. We examine these claims by determining which registered voters lack a DMV-issued photo ID. Multivariate models show that African Americans, Hispanics, and the elderly are less likely to have a DMV-issued photo ID. Having a photo ID is unrelated to income measured at the zip code level. Those registrants lacking photo IDs were less likely to have voted in general elections in 2004 and 2006 compared to other registrants. In addition, voters without photo identification were more likely to have voted in the 2006 but not the 2004 Democratic primary.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hood, M.V., Bullock, C. S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-09</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08316608</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Worth a Thousand Words?: An Analysis of Georgia's Voter Identification Statute]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>579</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-07-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>555</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/4/580?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Voters' Evaluations of Electronic Voting Systems: Results From a Usability Field Study]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/4/580?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Electronic voting systems were developed, in part, to make voting easier and to boost voters' confidence in the election process. Using three new approaches to studying electronic voting systems&mdash;focusing on a large-scale field study of the usability of a representative set of systems&mdash;we demonstrate that voters view these systems favorably but that design differences have a substantial impact on voters' satisfaction with the voting process and on the need to request help. Factors associated with the digital divide played only a small role with respect to overall satisfaction but they were strongly associated with feeling the need for help. Results suggest numerous possible improvements in electronic voting systems as well as the need for continued analysis that assesses specific characteristics of both optical scan and direct recording electronic systems.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Herrnson, P. S., Niemi, R. G., Hanmer, M. J., Francia, P. L., Bederson, B. B., Conrad, F. G., Traugott, M. W.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-09</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08316667</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Voters' Evaluations of Electronic Voting Systems: Results From a Usability Field Study]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>611</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-07-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>580</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/4/612?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA["At Your Service": Voter Evaluations of Poll Worker Performance]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/4/612?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The experiences in Florida in 2000 and Ohio in 2004 demonstrate that the election process can fall short of voters' expectations. In the wake of reforms, such as the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, scholars have attempted to identify ways in which the objective conditions in polling places shape citizens' experiences and overall confidence in the electoral system. Early studies reveal that poll workers play a major role in the way voters feel about their voting experience. Using exit poll data on the delivery of service at the polling locations, we study the determinants of reactions to poll workers. We find poll worker evaluations are responsive to wait times, feelings of privacy while voting, poll worker training, and special poll worker recruiting efforts, to name a few. When voters feel good about their interactions with poll workers, they feel better about their voting experience and more confident about the electoral system.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Claassen, R. L., Magleby, D. B., Monson, J. Q., Patterson, K. D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-09</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08319006</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA["At Your Service": Voter Evaluations of Poll Worker Performance]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>634</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-07-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>612</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/335?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Symbolism Versus Policy Learning: Public Opinion of the 1996 U.S. Welfare Reforms]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/335?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The logic of democracy rests on the assumption that policymakers respond to public preferences, which, in turn, respond to policy developments. We address the question of how policy might affect public opinion by analyzing public opinion before and after the 1996 U.S. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. We hypothesized that changes made by the legislation would have improved opinions of welfare recipients. Using U.S. surveys from 1994 and 2001, we find that public opinion was more positive postreform and that the change was because of the enactment of welfare reform itself, not any perceived program success.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hetling, A., McDermott, M. L., Mapps, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07313736</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Symbolism Versus Policy Learning: Public Opinion of the 1996 U.S. Welfare Reforms]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>357</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>335</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/358?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Constituency Population and Representation in the U.S. House]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/358?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The U.S. House of Representatives has remained frozen at 435 members for almost a century. House members on average represent more than 640,000 citizens, which is expected to continue to rise if the body remains constituted of close to 435 members. One assertion put forward by critics of this rise is that it leads to a less intimate relationship between the representative and the constituent. Yet there has not been empirical substantiation that the increase in constituency population size has interfered with the representational linkage in the House. This study employs a series of multivariate models using survey data from the American National Election Study to test whether citizens in more heavily populated House districts have less access to their representatives and are less likely to approve of their performance. Findings indicate that increases in House district population size reduce the accessibility and approval of U.S. House members.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Frederick, B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07309740</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Constituency Population and Representation in the U.S. House]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>381</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>358</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/382?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Solicitor General's Amicus Curiae Strategies in the Supreme Court]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/382?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Scholars have devoted a great deal of research to investigating the role and influence of the U.S. solicitor general (SG) as amicus curiae in the Supreme Court. Yet, we know little about the SG's decision to file an amicus brief and how this relates to the SG's success on the merits. We fill this void by examining legal, political, and administrative factors that affect the SG's decision to participate as amicus curiae. We subject our hypotheses to empirical testing using data on the 1953 to 1999 Supreme Court terms by linking the SG's decision to file an amicus brief to the SG's ultimate success on the merits, employing a Heckman-style selection model. We find that the SG's decision to file an amicus brief is influenced by legal, political, and administrative considerations, suggesting that the SG is best viewed through the incorporation of a variety of theoretical perspectives.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nicholson, C., Collins, P. M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07309602</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Solicitor General's Amicus Curiae Strategies in the Supreme Court]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>415</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>382</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/416?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Testing Murphy's Strategic Model: Assigning the Majority Opinion to the Marginal Justice in the Conference Coalition on the U.S. Supreme Court]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/416?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Murphy contended that an astute chief justice could assign the majority opinion to the "most moderate member" of the conference coalition, hoping that such an assignment "might prevent defection or even gain adherents." We discovered that Murphy's model was partially supported with data from the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts. When the conference coalition was larger than minimum winning (mw), assignment of the majority opinion to the marginal justice in the conference coalition was more likely to result in an opinion joined by the other justices in the conference coalition, making it an effective defensive strategy. It may not, however, be a very effective offensive strategy.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arrington, T. S., Brenner, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07308357</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Testing Murphy's Strategic Model: Assigning the Majority Opinion to the Marginal Justice in the Conference Coalition on the U.S. Supreme Court]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>432</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>416</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/433?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Look Who's Coming to Dinner: Direct Versus Brokered Member Campaign Contributions to the NRCC]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/433?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>House congressional campaign committees (CCCs) have increasingly relied on incumbents for financial support during the past decade. To raise money for their party's CCC, incumbents can (a) contribute to the CCC through their own principal campaign committee and/or leadership PAC or (b) broker contributions from donors. The authors argue that direct incumbent contributions make available to the party campaign committee broader contribution networks than do brokered incumbent contributions. One observable implication of this thesis is that ties to D.C. lobbyists should be a more powerful predictor of brokered than of direct contributions to the CCCs. Comparing Federal Election Commission data on direct member contributions to the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) with unique data on member ticket sales to the 2005 NRCC March Gala, the authors find strong support for this expectation. Soliciting direct contributions from incumbents appears to be a better means for the CCCs to gain access to new campaign money.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Heberlig, E. S., Larson, B. A., Smith, D. A., Soltis, K. L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07309737</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Look Who's Coming to Dinner: Direct Versus Brokered Member Campaign Contributions to the NRCC]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>450</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>433</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/451?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Strategic Intercameral Behavior and the Sequence of Congressional Lawmaking]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/451?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In the vein of some fledgling theoretical work on Congress, I look for evidence of strategic intercameral behavior in the chamber sequence of the passage of 950 bills from 1955 to 2002. Specifically, I construct and test a semiformal model in which communication is assumed to take place between congressional majority party leaders capable of choreographing bill passage using their agenda control powers. These leaders allow the chamber with the majority whose ideal point is furthest from the president's to pass its version of the bill first. The empirical analysis corroborates the model.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Taylor, A. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-04-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07308513</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Strategic Intercameral Behavior and the Sequence of Congressional Lawmaking]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>474</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>451</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/155?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[A Prejudice for the Thinking Classes: Media Exposure, Political Sophistication, and the Anti-Christian Fundamentalist]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/155?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Research on attitudes toward Christian fundamentalists shows that antagonism toward this group has become a significant factor since the early 1990s in structuring candidate preferences and issue positions. This article explores how information conveyed in news media helped inform popular evaluations of fundamentalists and instruct antifundamentalists on how to make use of these judgments politically in the culture wars. Our thesis is that attitudes toward Christian fundamentalists can be considered in large measure as a reaction to messages about this group carried in media, filtered through individual differences in political attentiveness and predispositions. Data from the 1988&mdash;2004 American National Election Studies show significant media effects, which increased over time, particularly among the sophisticated segment of the public. Our findings illuminate how variation in media attentiveness and individual differences in political and cultural predispositions conjoin to determine whether and the degree to which nonfundamentalists feel antagonistically toward Christian fundamentalists.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bolce, L., De Maio, G.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07309601</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A Prejudice for the Thinking Classes: Media Exposure, Political Sophistication, and the Anti-Christian Fundamentalist]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>185</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>155</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/186?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Exit, Voice, and Interest Group Governance]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/186?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Interest groups constitute critical mediating institutions linking citizens and political elites, thereby enhancing participation and representation at all levels of government. But to what extent are citizens connected to the organizations to which they belong? In this article, we demonstrate that some voluntary organizations are structured more democratically than others and examine the reasons for these differences. Analyzing the bylaws of a random sample of 114 national membership organizations, we find that groups from which exit is more costly (professional associations and unions) are structured more democratically than those in which members face fewer barriers to exit (citizen associations). Our findings raise important concerns about the extent to which members of citizen associations are provided meaningful avenues for participation and, ultimately, the extent to which these organizations truly link citizens to their government.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Barakso, M., Schaffner, B. F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07306545</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Exit, Voice, and Interest Group Governance]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>209</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>186</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/210?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Who's Ambivalent and Who's Not? Social Welfare Ambivalence Across Ideology]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/210?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This study uses a fresh approach to measure social welfare ambivalence, addressing the question of who is more ambivalent about such policies&mdash; liberals or conservatives. The findings presented here challenge previous assertions that liberals are typically more ambivalent. I argue that conservatives are now more ambivalent than liberals because a change in the tone of elite discourse altered the priming of the potential sources of such ambivalence. The models of ambivalence presented suggest that these primed sources are conflicting thoughts or beliefs (cognitive conflict), conflicting feelings (affective conflict), or beliefs in conflict with feelings (cognitive&mdash;affective conflict). The implications of these findings are discussed.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gainous, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07312584</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Who's Ambivalent and Who's Not? Social Welfare Ambivalence Across Ideology]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>235</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>210</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/236?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Religious Traditionalism and Latino Politics in the United States]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/236?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article examines how and why ethnic context conditions the link between religious traditionalism and the political attitudes and behaviors of Latinos in the United States. Existing research shows that the impact of religious traditionalism on political attitudes varies by policy and religious context. Through an analysis of issue attitudes, ideology, and partisanship, we confirm this existing work and also show that religious traditionalism influences Latino political behavior differently than it influences Anglo politics. The impact of religious traditionalism is not nearly as strong among Latinos as among Anglos. To the extent that traditionalism does influence political attitudes and behavior, it generally produces greater ideological conservatism but does not translate into support for the Republican Party&mdash;the latter is quite different from its impact in the Anglo population.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kelly, N. J., Morgan, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07309738</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Religious Traditionalism and Latino Politics in the United States]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>263</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>236</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/264?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Structuring Gender's Impact: Judicial Voting Across Criminal Justice Cases]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/264?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The importance of judge gender as a factor in judicial votes continues to attract much scholarly attention. I contribute to the debate on the influence of judge gender by examining the voting behavior of male and female state supreme court justices in three areas of criminal justice. I find that female justices, controlling for institutional, political, and legal constraints, are more likely than are their male counterparts to rule for the criminal defendant and in a broader array of cases than commonly thought. I conclude that judge gender is a significant factor in the outcome of judicial decisions and that the number of women on the courts is a factor in judicial decision making.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[McCall, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07307969</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Structuring Gender's Impact: Judicial Voting Across Criminal Justice Cases]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>296</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>264</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/297?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens' Diffuse Support for State Courts]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/2/297?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in <I>Bush v. Gore</I>, the public's support for the judicial system looms as an especially important concern. Although studies have confirmed that the Supreme Court's reservoir of public goodwill has remained largely intact following the politically divisive decision, the status of public support for other American courts has received little attention. This reflects a broader trend in judicial politics scholarship toward placing inordinate attention on explaining public support for the U.S. Supreme Court while largely ignoring the courts where most of the policymaking in the nation occurs&mdash;state courts. We use a national survey to assess the factors influencing diffuse support for state courts. We find that although many considerations affecting diffuse support for state courts parallel the determinants of such support for the nation's high Court, important differences exist between explanations of citizen support for state courts and the Supreme Court. Most notably, judicial elections and concerns over judicial campaign contributions work to undermine citizens' support for their state courts.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cann, D. M., Yates, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-08</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X07308737</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens' Diffuse Support for State Courts]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>36</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>329</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>297</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

</rdf:RDF>