<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>

<rdf:RDF
 xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
 xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"
 xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/"
 xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
 xmlns:syn="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
 xmlns:prism="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/prism/"
 xmlns:admin="http://webns.net/mvcb/"
>

<channel rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com">
<title>American Politics Research recent issues</title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com</link>
<description>American Politics Research RSS feed -- recent issues</description>
<prism:publicationName>American Politics Research</prism:publicationName>
<prism:issn>1532-673X</prism:issn>
<items>
 <rdf:Seq>
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/955?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/983?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1003?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1024?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1048?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1088?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1116?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/727?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/742?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/767?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/801?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/824?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/856?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/879?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/899?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/921?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/539?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/569?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/593?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/614?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/644?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/670?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/700?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/375?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/409?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/429?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/449?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/465?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/486?rss=1" />
  <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/508?rss=1" />
 </rdf:Seq>
</items>
<image rdf:resource="http://apr.sagepub.com:80/icons/banner/title.gif" />
</channel>

<image rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com:80/icons/banner/title.gif">
<title>American Politics Research</title>
<url>http://apr.sagepub.com:80/icons/banner/title.gif</url>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com</link>
</image>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/955?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Are Mapmakers Able to Target and Protect Congressional Incumbents?: The Institutional Dynamics of Electoral Competition]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/955?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Can those in charge of redistricting foster electoral competitiveness by targeting some congressional incumbents while protecting others from potent competition? We provide an answer by presenting the <I>dynamic redistricting thesis</I>, which holds that the type of redistricting plan and the time passed since its enactment affect the emergence of high-quality congressional candidates. We demonstrate that the effect of redistricting on competition depends on whether incumbents belong to the party that controlled the redistricting process. We show that partisan plans have predictable systematic effects, with incumbents in the minority more likely to face strong opponents. Moreover, the effect of redistricting on competition is highest at the beginning of the 10-year redistricting cycle and diminishes in a nonlinear fashion over the course of the cycle. The implications of our theory and findings for democracy are apparent: Institutions are an important determinant of the variation of electoral competition across time and space.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Murphy, C., Yoshinaka, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 26 Oct 2009 16:51:44 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08326385</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Are Mapmakers Able to Target and Protect Congressional Incumbents?: The Institutional Dynamics of Electoral Competition]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>6</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>982</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>955</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/983?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Delegation and Discretion in Anticipation of Coalitional Drift]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/983?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>If legislators are sensitive to coalitional drift, they must perforce be forward looking. In this article, we propose that legislators anticipate change in government&mdash;and any associated coalitional drift. That is, legislators recognize that the government could move from unified to divided or divided to unified. As such, how legislators structure an agency&rsquo;s discretion may be affected by the current partisan control of the Congress and the White House as well as their anticipated partisan control. Using U.S. trade legislation data from 1890 to 1990, we find strong empirical evidence that legislators alter agency discretion prior to changes in the political status quo.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ainsworth, S. H., Harward, B. M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 26 Oct 2009 16:51:45 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X09334770</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Delegation and Discretion in Anticipation of Coalitional Drift]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>6</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1002</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>983</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1003?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Proclaiming Trade Policy: "Delegated Unilateral Powers" and the Limits on Presidential Unilateral Enactment of Trade Policy]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1003?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article examines presidential proclamations on trade policy, a category of presidential unilateral power that we call delegated unilateral power that is used frequently in creating or modifying trade policy, between the period 1974 and 2006 and tests the boundaries of the explanations predicted by the unilateral powers literature. We also find that the use of proclamations on trade policy is independent of the partisan balance in Congress. The use of proclamations modifying policies was the only tactic that comported with predicted actions from the unilateral presidency. Therefore, contrary to the expectations of the unilateral presidency, presidents are not unrestrained political agents on trade policy, and although presidents have the capacity to do so, they rarely use political factors as a pretext to enact unilateral policy on trade. Ultimately, unilateral powers are not all created equal, as some allow for considerable presidential authority and some are more limited.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rottinghaus, B., Lim, E.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 26 Oct 2009 16:51:45 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08328290</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Proclaiming Trade Policy: "Delegated Unilateral Powers" and the Limits on Presidential Unilateral Enactment of Trade Policy]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>6</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1023</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1003</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1024?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Adopting Direct Democracy: Tests of Competing Explanations of Institutional Change]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1024?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Why was direct democracy adopted in some U.S. states and not others? In this article, we sort through the various arguments advanced in the predominantly historical literature by using event history analysis. Among other factors we identify the importance of popular support for Populists and Socialists as well as the constraints imposed by state constitutions. We also find that the demographic composition of states was strongly associated with success or failure to adopt the initiative. Furthermore, we identify a number of key cases&mdash;highlighted by this approach&mdash;that present intriguing anomalies to the general patterns identified in the historical and political science literatures to date.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lawrence, E. D., Donovan, T., Bowler, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 26 Oct 2009 16:51:45 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X09335487</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Adopting Direct Democracy: Tests of Competing Explanations of Institutional Change]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>6</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1047</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1024</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1048?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Value Preferences and Ideological Structuring of Attitudes in American Public Opinion]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1048?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In this study, we investigate four attitudinal structures (including liberal, conservative, and libertarian configurations) associated with two ideological dimensions among American voters and demonstrate that these attitudinal structures are related in expected ways to differential preferences for the values of freedom, order, and equality/caring. Liberals are inclined to trade freedom for equality/caring but not for order, whereas conservatives are their opposites&mdash;willing to trade freedom for order but not for equality/caring. In contrast, libertarians are generally less willing than others to trade freedom for either order or equality/caring (although they probably prefer order to equality/caring). The fourth ideological type is more willing than the others to relinquish freedom, preferring both order <I>and</I> equality/caring. Depending on how our results are interpreted, this fourth type may be characterized as either communitarian or humanitarian. These findings help close the gap between unidimensional conceptions and multidimensional evidence of ideological organization in political attitudes by demonstrating that value structure and attitudinal structure are strongly related in two ideological dimensions.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Swedlow, B., Wyckoff, M. L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 26 Oct 2009 16:51:45 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X09333959</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Value Preferences and Ideological Structuring of Attitudes in American Public Opinion]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>6</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1087</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1048</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1088?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Effect of Local Political Context on How Americans Vote]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1088?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Neighborhood context could condition voting decisions, but systematic investigation of whether (how) the traits of a given locale shape individual voting decisions is sparse. We explore the possibility that local partisan balance affects turnout and the use of convenience voting in particular. Using comprehensive registered-voter lists from four swing states in the 2002 and 2006 elections, we find an intriguing asymmetry: Republican registrants are usually sensitive to partisan context, whereas Democrats are not. Republican election-day turnout rates generally decrease with the proportion of partisan registrants that are Democratic in the area. This demobilization is only sporadically counterbalanced by greater use of convenience voting. In contrast, Democrats exhibit less systematic patterns. In many cases, there are seemingly perverse effects, wherein Democratic turnout rates fall with growing Democratic registration advantages. The asymmetry may be driven by differences in the competitiveness of elections in areas with notable imbalances in partisan registration.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dyck, J. J., Gaines, B. J., Shaw, D. R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 26 Oct 2009 16:51:45 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X09332932</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Effect of Local Political Context on How Americans Vote]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>6</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1115</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1088</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1116?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Punctuated Budgets and Governors' Institutional Powers]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/6/1116?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>State budgets are flexible: In the same year, some budget categories dramatically rise or fall, whereas others closely follow the previous year&rsquo;s appropriation. Public policy scholars label a budget that contains mainly small scale changes interspersed with dramatic fluctuations as punctuated. This research seeks to identify the determinants of these punctuated budgets in the American states. What causes both incremental and large scale budgetary change? We argue that a governor&rsquo;s agenda setting and veto powers increase the extent to which state budgets are punctuated. First, institutionally strong governors can dominate budgetary agendas but are subject to heightened information costs. Second, strong governors can also block legislative alternatives, but thereby induce transactions costs that hinder fiscal policy adjustments. The article analyzes these institutional constraints at the American state level using maximum likelihood estimation on panel data from 1983 to 1999. We make two contributions to the study of American public policy. First, we offer a broad empirical analysis of the causes of punctuated change. Second, we present a method by which to measure punctuated distributions over time. This method can be applied to other areas of public policy research.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Breunig, C., Koski, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 26 Oct 2009 16:51:45 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X09333583</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Punctuated Budgets and Governors' Institutional Powers]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>6</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1138</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1116</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/727?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Social Networks and American Politics: Introduction to the Special Issue]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/727?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article overviews the special issue on "Social Networks and American Politics." The authors explain that social network analysis is a multimethod set of approaches to examining the pattern of connections that are created among individuals and institutions when they engage in their daily activities. It is especially valuable when research problems are about (a) the flow of information; (b) coordination, cooperation, or trust; (c) informal organization; or (d) multiple levels of organization. In addressing these problems, network analysis has expanded during the last decade within the study of American politics, contributing to knowledge about political institutions, behavior, and network theory. Promising directions for future research include the study of power, preference aggregation, information flow and transaction costs, and network dynamics.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Heaney, M. T., McClurg, S. D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 14 Aug 2009 11:14:56 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X09337771</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Social Networks and American Politics: Introduction to the Special Issue]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>741</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>727</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/742?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Social Utility of Informal Institutions: Caucuses as Networks in the 110th U.S. House of Representatives]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/742?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article challenges the existing state-of-knowledge about legislative caucuses by arguing that the caucus system reflects and reinforces formal organizing institutions, such as parties and committees, rather than counterbalancing them. We argue that legislators engage in the caucus system to maximize the social utility of their relationships. Using a social network framework, we develop and test hypotheses that seek to ascertain the types of legislators that assume elevated positions in the caucus network. We collect data on the complete population of caucuses and their members from the first session of the 110th U.S. House of Representatives and conduct social network analyses to find evidence that the caucus system supports the hierarchical structure of existing formal institutions.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Victor, J. N., Ringe, N.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 14 Aug 2009 11:14:56 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X09337183</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Social Utility of Informal Institutions: Caucuses as Networks in the 110th U.S. House of Representatives]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>766</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>742</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/767?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Party Coalitions and Interest Group Networks]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/767?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>We analyze affiliation networks of interest groups that endorse the same candidates in primary elections, donate to the same candidates in general elections, and voice support for the same legislative proposals. Patterns of interest group ties resemble two competing party coalitions in elections but not in legislative debate. Campaign endorsement and financial contribution ties among interest groups are consistently correlated but legislative ties do not follow directly from electoral alliances. The results challenge the consensus in the emerging literature on the expanded party organization; interest groups have distinct incentives to join together in a party coalition in elections but also to build bipartisan grand coalitions to pursue legislative goals. We also modify conventional views on party differences. The Democratic coalition is not fractured into many small constituencies. The Democratic campaign and legislative networks are denser than equivalent Republican networks, with a core of labor organizations occupying central positions.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Grossmann, M., Dominguez, C. B. K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 14 Aug 2009 11:14:56 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08329464</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Party Coalitions and Interest Group Networks]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>800</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>767</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/801?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Governing U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Self-Organizing and Multiplex Service Networks]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/801?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>How are fragmented metropolitan areas characterized by multiple actors and multiple relationships governed? This has been a question of enduring interest in the study of local politics and policy. Recent works have made progress in understanding the emergence of self-organizing networks for individual service relationships. However, in the context of multiple service relationships, patterns of service networks that evolve as a consequence of local governments&rsquo; actions to address transaction problems have been long overlooked. This article begins to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing pay-for-service contracts across multiple municipal services in one metropolitan county in Florida. The results obtained from matrix correlation and matrix regression based on a quadratic assignment procedure reveal that local jurisdictions develop cross-service reciprocity networks in a multiple services contract environment to resolve credibility of commitment problems they encounter in entering and maintaining interlocal service contracts.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Shrestha, M. K., Feiock, R. C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 14 Aug 2009 11:14:56 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X09337466</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Governing U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Self-Organizing and Multiplex Service Networks]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>823</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>801</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/824?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Implications of Class, Race, and Ethnicity for Political Networks]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/824?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Previous research demonstrates the importance of citizens&rsquo; communication networks as an influence on their political behavior. Yet most findings are limited to samples of Whites or the interaction of Whites with their discussants. This article extends our attention to the social networks of Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and noncitizens, and explores how communication processes differ across them. Using data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, we first compare various characteristics of social networks across racial and ethnic groups. Second, we test whether the network-based advantages of Whites, compared with other groups, result from differences in individual socioeconomic status or from group-based social resources. Third, we investigate whether interracial interaction affects race-related attitudes. In conclusion, we urge scholars who study social networks to recognize the important consequences of racial diversity for more fully understanding the political behavior of all Americans, whether Anglo, Black, Latino, or Asian.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Leighley, J. E., Matsubayashi, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 14 Aug 2009 11:14:56 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X09337889</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Implications of Class, Race, and Ethnicity for Political Networks]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>855</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>824</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/856?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Civic Talk and Civic Participation: The Moderating Effect of Individual Predispositions]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/856?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Individuals who discuss politics and current events in their social network also participate in civic activities. However, analytical biases make it difficult to show a causal relationship between these two phenomena. To obtain a more accurate measurement of the effect that civic talk has on civic participation, data were collected through a panel study conducted on students who were randomly assigned to their college dormitory roommates. These data show that engaging in civic talk causes civic participation. The evidence also shows that the civic talk effect is mitigated for individuals who are not already predisposed to participate in civic activities.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Klofstad, C. A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 14 Aug 2009 11:14:56 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X09333960</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Civic Talk and Civic Participation: The Moderating Effect of Individual Predispositions]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>878</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>856</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/879?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Are Diverse Political Networks Always Bad for Participatory Democracy?: Indifference, Alienation, and Political Disagreements]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/879?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Political discussions within interpersonal networks not only help communicate political information that is otherwise too costly to obtain, but they also expose people to political views that are not necessarily congruent to their own predispositions. In exploring consequences of exposure to political disagreements, existing literature finds an interesting dilemma: Although political disagreements contribute to the deliberative democracy by encouraging greater awareness of rationales for opposing views as well as greater political tolerance, they undermine the prospect for participatory democracy by demobilizing people. In response, this article shows that experiences of political disagreements do not necessarily discourage political participation. More specifically, based on the American National Election Study 2000, we find that the demobilizing effect of political disagreements continues to decrease with increasing levels of indifference and alienation between the candidates. Furthermore, among highly alienated individuals, we find that experiences of political disagreements can actually promote their voting turnout.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jang, S.-J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 14 Aug 2009 11:14:56 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X09332790</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Are Diverse Political Networks Always Bad for Participatory Democracy?: Indifference, Alienation, and Political Disagreements]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>898</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>879</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/899?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/899?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Networks can affect a group&rsquo;s ability to solve a coordination problem. We use laboratory experiments to study the conditions under which groups of participants can solve coordination games. We investigate a variety of different network structures, and we also investigate coordination games with symmetric and asymmetric payoffs. Our results show that network connections facilitate coordination in both symmetric and asymmetric games. Most significantly, we find that an increase in the number of connections improves coordination even when payoffs are highly asymmetric. These results shed light on the conditions that may facilitate coordination in real-world networks.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[McCubbins, M. D., Paturi, R., Weller, N.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 14 Aug 2009 11:14:56 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X09337184</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>920</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>899</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/921?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Interdependence, Density Dependence, and Networks in Politics]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/5/921?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article addresses the theoretical and methodological challenges that arise due to the interdependence of actors within political processes. Networks of communication and association provide a resolution to the micro&mdash;macro problem in political analysis&mdash;they provide a vehicle through which individual behavior is reciprocally connected to behavior in the aggregate. A central argument of the article is that these networks are endogenous not only to individual choice and preference, but also to the environmentally imposed supply of associates, giving rise to patterns of density dependence in politics. Density dependence, in turn, produces its own complex consequences for political processes, and hence interdependence frequently becomes a theoretical as well as a methodological imperative in political analysis.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Huckfeldt, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 14 Aug 2009 11:14:56 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X09337462</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Interdependence, Density Dependence, and Networks in Politics]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>5</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>950</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>921</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/539?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Initiated Distrust: Direct Democracy and Trust in Government]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/539?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>An abundance of recent research has suggested that direct democracy institutions, such as the initiative and referendum, craft an environment ripe for encouraging better democratic citizenship. High and frequent exposure to ballot measures has been shown to increase the awareness, efficacy, political participation, and even the general level of happiness of citizens. In contrast to these studies, I develop and test a theory that the use of ballot initiatives undermines the ability of government to prove themselves trustworthy. Using data from two surveys, I demonstrate that ballot initiatives in the American states do indeed create an environment that encourages citizens to distrust their government. The findings have implications in assessing the positive externalities to direct legislation as well as in understanding policy choice made in these elections.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dyck, J. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 15 Jun 2009 16:31:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08330635</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Initiated Distrust: Direct Democracy and Trust in Government]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>568</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-07-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>539</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/569?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Racial Context Effects and the Political Participation of Asian Americans]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/569?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In 1948, V. O. Key demonstrated how racial context influences political attitudes and behavior in the South. In more recent studies, racial linked fate and racial discrimination have been identified as powerful predictors of minority political behavior. What remains unexplored in the literature is whether race-based predictors such as these vary as a direct function of racial context and, as a result, increases or decreases political participation. Past research has focused on the singular effects of racial linked fate or discrimination but has yet to examine its potential interactive effects with racial context. To assess these potentially interactive effects, this article focuses on Asian Americans living within two distinct racial contexts: Hawaii and the mainland states of California, New York, and Illinois. Although there is no effect on Asian American voting behavior, results indicate significant interactive effects of race-based predictors and racial context on Asian American nonvoting participation.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rim, K. H.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 15 Jun 2009 16:31:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08326968</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Racial Context Effects and the Political Participation of Asian Americans]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>592</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-07-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>569</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/593?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Comparing Predictors of Women's Congressional Election Success: Candidates, Primaries, and the General Election]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/593?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Examining all Congressional races from 1992 through 2000, we explore why, over time, some districts are more likely to have women candidates and to elect women than are others. We focus on the obvious, but rarely explored, fact that women's election success is a product of three key stages of the election process: women running, women's successes in the primaries, and finally, women's general election successes. We find that different factors predict success at each stage and that the predictors of women's candidacies and success in open seat races are different than in others.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ondercin, H. L., Welch, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 15 Jun 2009 16:31:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08325198</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Comparing Predictors of Women's Congressional Election Success: Candidates, Primaries, and the General Election]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>613</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-07-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>593</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/614?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Veni, Vidi, Disseri: Churches and the Promise of Democratic Deliberation]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/614?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>As the most popular voluntary association in the United States, churches are sometimes touted as saviors of democracy. However, those who espouse deliberative models of democracy rarely see churches as nurturing the decision-making abilities of attenders. Thus, the authors examine the extent to which church small group sessions fulfill the conditions for deliberation as set forth by political theorists. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, the authors find that churches offer authentic opportunities through small group involvements and, accordingly, tentatively declare the existence of a religious civility, with churches acting in the service of democratic capacity.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Neiheisel, J. R., Djupe, P. A., Sokhey, A. E.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 15 Jun 2009 16:31:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08324216</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Veni, Vidi, Disseri: Churches and the Promise of Democratic Deliberation]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>643</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-07-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>614</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/644?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Voter Rolloff in a Low-Information Context: Evidence From Intermediate Appellate Court Elections]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/644?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Hall notes that ballot rolloff in supreme court races is substantial but not random. Various institutional, election-specific, state, and district-level contextual forces lead rolloff to increase in some cases and decrease in others. However, it is not clear that Hall's findings apply to lower-level judicial elections because of the low-information environment in which those elections occur. Analyzing rolloff in 755 intermediate appellate court (IAC) elections from 2000 to 2007, we, with a few deviations, replicate Hall's study. The findings indicate that in many ways the variables that affect rolloff in supreme court elections are similar to those in IAC races although some differences do exist.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Streb, M. J., Frederick, B., LaFrance, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 15 Jun 2009 16:31:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08326045</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Voter Rolloff in a Low-Information Context: Evidence From Intermediate Appellate Court Elections]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>669</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-07-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>644</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/670?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Counteractive Lobbying in the U.S. Supreme Court]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/670?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Theories of counteractive lobbying assert that interest groups lobby for the purpose of neutralizing the advocacy efforts of their opponents. We examine the applicability of counteractive lobbying to explain interest group amicus curiae participation in the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on the merits. Testing the counteractive lobbying hypotheses from 1953 to 2001, we provide strong support for the contention that interest groups engage in counteractive lobbying in the nation's highest court. Our findings indicate that, like the elected branches of government, the Supreme Court is properly viewed as a battleground for public policy in which organized interests clash in their attempts to etch their policy preferences into law.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Solowiej, L. A., Collins, P. M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 15 Jun 2009 16:31:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08328674</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Counteractive Lobbying in the U.S. Supreme Court]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>699</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-07-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>670</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/700?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[A Bayesian Prediction Model for the U.S. Presidential Election]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/700?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>It has become a popular pastime for political pundits and scholars alike to predict the winner of the U.S. presidential election. Although forecasting has now quite a history, we argue that the closeness of recent presidential elections and the wide accessibility of data should change how presidential election forecasting is conducted. We present a Bayesian forecasting model that concentrates on the Electoral College outcome and considers finer details such as third-party candidates and self-proclaimed undecided voters. We incorporate our estimators into a dynamic programming algorithm to determine the probability that a candidate will win an election.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rigdon, S. E., Jacobson, S. H., Tam Cho, W. K., Sewell, E. C., Rigdon, C. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 15 Jun 2009 16:31:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08330670</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A Bayesian Prediction Model for the U.S. Presidential Election]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>724</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-07-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>700</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/375?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Partisan Strength and Nonpartisanship Among Asian Americans]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/375?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Relatively little is known about partisan identification among immigrant-dominated ethnic groups in the United States. In this article we build on the work of Lien, Conway, and Wong (2004) to explore patterns of partisan strength and nonpartisanship among Asian Americans. We note that more than one third of Asian Americans do not identify themselves on the standard seven-point partisan identification scale, indicating that they either have no party attachment (denoted <I> no-party nonpartisans</I>) or are not sure of their partisanship (denoted <I> unsure nonpartisans</I>). Using data from the 2000-2001 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey, we estimate separate models of (a) partisan acquisition (i.e., partisan vs. nonpartisan), (b) strength of partisanship, and (c) type of nonpartisanship. As expected, we find significant differences in this Asian American sample between partisans and nonpartisans and among strong partisans, weak or independent-leaning partisans, and pure independents. In our nonpartisanship model, we also find discernible differences among pure independents, no-party nonpartisans, and unsure nonpartisans. Our findings address questions about how one should test models of party strength in Asian American samples, particularly given the relatively large percentage of nonpartisans among Asian Americans in comparison to samples drawn from the general population.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nguyen, N. K., Garand, J. C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 01 May 2009 16:04:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08324228</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Partisan Strength and Nonpartisanship Among Asian Americans]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>408</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>375</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/409?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Gender Stereotypes and Attitudes Toward Gender Balance in Government]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/409?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The desire to elect more women to public office is likely to affect a range of political behaviors and may explain the relatively low levels of women's descriptive representation overall. Yet, little is known about the public's view of the ideal gender composition of government. We find that the public expresses a preference for higher levels of women's representation than the country has experienced. Women are more likely than men to express a view, though men and women do not differ in their preferences on the ideal percentage of male officeholders. We examine the role of gender stereotypes and the experience of being represented by women officeholders in shaping support for women's representation.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dolan, K., Sanbonmatsu, K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 01 May 2009 16:04:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08322109</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Gender Stereotypes and Attitudes Toward Gender Balance in Government]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>428</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>409</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/429?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Put to the Test: Understanding Differences in Support for High-Stakes Testing]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/429?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Despite the importance of high-stakes tests in education policy, relatively little is known about opinion on this issue. We examine racial and socioeconomic differences in support for high-stakes testing. Given the achievement gaps between racial minorities and Whites and between the lower and higher status, it would be reasonable to expect that those whose children are most likely to do well on high-stakes tests would support the policy, whereas their counterparts would oppose them. However, these groups have different histories with and optimism about the public education system as well as different perceptions about how high-stakes tests will affect their children. We find that Latinos strongly support these measures, whereas African Americans and Whites oppose them primarily because African Americans are pessimistic about improving public schools and Whites are concerned about how resources will be redistributed. We also find that those of higher status are more likely to oppose high-stakes testing.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lay, J. C., Stokes-Brown, A. K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 01 May 2009 16:04:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08320843</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Put to the Test: Understanding Differences in Support for High-Stakes Testing]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>448</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>429</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/449?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Ambition and Party Loyalty in the U.S. Senate]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/449?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article examines the role progressive ambition plays in the U.S. Senate. I analyze the effect ambition has on party loyalty in the upper chamber. The theoretical argument is that senators with ambition for higher office are more loyal to the party than their colleagues who never make a bid for higher office because of their need to appeal to the party base to secure the party's nomination. I posit the following hypothesis to test this theory: A senator who seeks higher office will be more likely to vote with the party on party votes than those senators who never run for the presidency. My findings indicate that ambitious senators are more loyal to the party than their colleagues who never make a bid for higher office. That is, senators who run for higher office recognize the importance of the party when it comes to successfully navigating the primary season.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Treul, S. A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 01 May 2009 16:04:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08322260</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Ambition and Party Loyalty in the U.S. Senate]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>464</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>449</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/465?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Role of Candidate Choice in the California Recall Election]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/465?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Many have argued that the reelection and later recall of Governor Gray Davis in California serves as a perfect example of how primaries draw politics to the extremes by nominating candidates too liberal or conservative for the general electorate. Davis defeated a conservative Republican opponent in his reelection campaign, only to lose in the recall just one year later when there were no primaries to prevent a moderate Republican from running. We test this notion with survey data from both elections. We find that the choice of candidates was important to votes in each election, but evaluations of Davis were far more significant and largely determined the outcome. We conclude with implications for the role of primaries in American politics generally.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[McGhee, E., Baldassare, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 01 May 2009 16:04:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08322816</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Role of Candidate Choice in the California Recall Election]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>485</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>465</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/486?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Departures From the Court: The Political Landscape and Institutional Constraints]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/486?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Previous findings on whether U.S. Supreme Court justices include strategic factors in their decisions to leave the Court have been mixed. We use ideological distance measures to capture the political landscape and retest the hypothesis that justices use strategic political considerations when making the decision to leave the Court. Using a Cox model of proportional hazards, we find that justices do take ideological distance from the Senate into account when making retirement decisions. Thus, the evidence indicates that justices engage in strategic behavior when contemplating retirement.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nelson, K. R., Ringsmuth, E. M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 01 May 2009 16:04:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08326056</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Departures From the Court: The Political Landscape and Institutional Constraints]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>507</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>486</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/508?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Assessing Presidential Power: Signing Statements and Veto Threats as Coordinated Strategies]]></title>
<link>http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/508?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Presidents have a wide array of strategies to influence legislation. One area that has seen less emphasis in the literature is the executive's unilateral ability to issue signing statements and their role in shaping policy. We develop a spatial model illustrating how the president's bargaining power with Congress can be expanded when the veto threat is coordinated with signing statements. The analysis suggests that signing statements, although underappreciated, may potentially be a valuable presidential tool in the veto bargaining process. The analysis also shows that veto threats are a key factor explaining the president's use of the constitutional signing statement. We infer that veto threats and signing statements are linked together as part of a larger coordinated strategy to exert presidential power in the legislative realm.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kelley, C. S., Marshall, B. W.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 01 May 2009 16:04:21 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1532673X08324426</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Assessing Presidential Power: Signing Statements and Veto Threats as Coordinated Strategies]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>37</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>533</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>508</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

</rdf:RDF>